Hydropolitical conflict across Africa

Hydro political conflict is often the part of hydro politics that gains the most publicity and attention, due to the potential controversy that can ensure and subsequent injuries and fatalities due to violent progression. Conflict also has the potential to incur 'water wars', whereby states will fight, through soft or hard power, over the supply, demand or distribution of water resources, due to water being of the utmost importance to human survival (Wolf, 1998) . What is not as highly publicised is cooperation over water, water can be 'a catalyst for peace' and more often than not, is the chosen solution to hydro political problems (Asmal, 2001) . There has been a substantial history of violence in Southern Africa, not only over water due to ongoing civil conflicts, often which are exacerbated by discrepancies natural resource distribution, due to the extreme climate of the region (Swatuk, 2015) . South African states share 15 river basins and with the recurring vi

The Orange Senqu River is located in southern Africa and is shared by three countries; Lesotho, South Africa and Namibia, with Botswana being a riparian state ( Sebastian, 2008 ). The river originates in the Lesotho Highlands where it is known as the Senqu River, and travels through to South Africa, Namibia and Botswana in the north. The river stretches for 2300km from its source to the Atlantic Ocean and is one of the largest and longest rivers in all of Southern Africa, covering an area of approximately 964, 000km2 ( Conley and van Niekerk, 1998 ). Map showing the location and journey of the Orange-Senqu River The Orange has one of the largest seasonal runoffs of all the rivers in South Africa and is an integral source of water and enabler of development for all its riparian states ( Basson, et al 1997 ). Out of all its riparian states, Namibia is most likely the most dependent on the river for both its socioeconomic development, water supply, but also to define its national

In this blog, I will exclusively explore the local hydro-political conflict that has ensued in Namwala District, a rural district located in Southern Zambia within the Kafue River Basin ( Schelle and Pittock, 2006 ).  The Kafue is one of the major tributaries to the Zambezi River with a catchment that occupies some 20% of Zambia’s total land area. Conflict, in this instance, is on a local scale as governance is represented through  the  full council in Namawala District and the majority of vested interests are domestic of those of local farmers and pastoralists ( Funder et al, 2010 ).  Figure 1 - Showing the geographical location of Namwala District in Zambia The provenance of such conflicts can be attributed to two main reasons; the discrepancy in developed water infrastructures in rural areas and insufficient coordination and management of water sources. Unfortunate seasonality in rainfall makes water distribution and conservation extremely variable. Water sources such as sh

The Pangani River Basin (PRB) covers an area of about 43, 650km2, mostly in Tanzania with approximately 5% in Kenya ( IUCN, 2003 ). For its 3.7 million Tanzanian inhabitants its water and arable land is important and the conflicts surrounding the supply, demand and use of the basin itself are numerous and multifaceted in nature. The number of players and those with stakes or vested interest in the basin's resources are high, making the coordination and ability to please everyone extremely tenacious. Figure 1 - Map of the Pangani River Basin The majority of many hydro political water conflicts are based around the concept of scale, whereby the scale and size of those water players involved determines the power and tract that they hold overall. In this case, conflict of scale is prevalent due to the presence of industrial interests and local and small scale interests. Industrial interests include hydropower supplied by the Tanganyika Electric Supply Company (TANESCO), who

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LWHP) is a binational proposal with the aim of supplying South Africa with water from the Lesotho highlands, which would be mutually beneficial to both parties. Lesotho wanted to harness its copious 'white gold' water supply into financial gain, by supplying the water-scarce South Africa with a valuable commodity ( Maro, 2011 ). This project, however was greatly overshadowed by hydro political conflict, whereby cooperation between the two riparian states was centred principally on the mutual gain of each's political elite (Mwangi, 2007) . Figure 1 - Map showing the LWHP and its context in South Africa  At the crux of this hydro political conflict, is the concept of water scarcity, where insufficient supply meets copious demand, which perpetually results in conflict among and within nations ( Gleick, 1993) . The project was first suggested by the British High Commissioner of Lesotho, when the country was still under British rule, a

Welcome to my blog!!  This site will endeavour to explain and analyse, in a short, sweet and succinct manner, the nature of hydropolitical conflict and how said conflict comes about across Africa, with a particular focus on  eastern and southern Africa.  In its simplest sense, the term "water conflict" describes any disagreement or dispute over or about water, where external social, economic, legal, political or military intervention is needed to resolve the problem (Ashton, 2007) . My site is also not restricted to purely African  hydropolitics,  other areas in Africa and even across the globe will be used as comparative examples, as hydropolitics is such a wide spread and prolific phenomenon.  I first became fascinated with water conflicts when I was 15, learning about a squatter settlement near Nairobi, Kenya, called Kibera which has a complex network of water supply systems (Wesangula, 2016) . This case study really emphasised to me the fact that water could be used