Blog 6: Hydro political conflict vs cooperation in Southern Africa

Hydro political conflict is often the part of hydro politics that gains the most publicity and attention, due to the potential controversy that can ensure and subsequent injuries and fatalities due to violent progression. Conflict also has the potential to incur 'water wars', whereby states will fight, through soft or hard power, over the supply, demand or distribution of water resources, due to water being of the utmost importance to human survival (Wolf, 1998). What is not as highly publicised is cooperation over water, water can be 'a catalyst for peace' and more often than not, is the chosen solution to hydro political problems (Asmal, 2001).

There has been a substantial history of violence in Southern Africa, not only over water due to ongoing civil conflicts, often which are exacerbated by discrepancies natural resource distribution, due to the extreme climate of the region (Swatuk, 2015). South African states share 15 river basins and with the recurring violence that characterised the region for many years, these basins were identified by scientists, 'to be at risk' and that they were likely to see an 'escalation of conflict' in the next 5 to 10 years (Wolf et al, 2003). However, such water war hypotheses were debunked by a long chain of water cooperation in the form of water treaties and agreements. In general, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation has identified more than 3600 treaties relating to international water resources, dating between 1805 and 1984 (UN FAO, 1978). 

It is important here, to address the differential power relations and dynamics that exist between riparian states, when discussing hydro politics (Sebastian, 2008). Much of the supposed success of water cooperation in the Southern African basins, is attributable to the 'hydro-hegemony' of South Africa (Turton and Funke, 2008). When post-apartheid South Africa decided to 'rejoin' the international community in the early 1990s, it wanted to make an impressive and reformed impression, the nature of its subsequent politics and diplomacy was redemptive, with the aim of being 'good global citizens' (Swatuk, 2015). Its ensuing participation in the management and resolution of the Orange-Senqu Basin, covered in the previous blog post, enabled cooperative outcomes, due to its 'hydro hegemony'. 

However, cooperation does not occur in every hydro political instance and is not always constructive and positive for every player involved. When asymmetric states are involved, for example South Africa is overwhelmingly the economic and military power in comparison to Lesotho, Namibia and Botswana, conflict resolution can often result in suboptimal outcomes for weaker states (Mokorosi et al, 2007). Diplomacy, is often in the best interests of national interest due to the large-scale inconvenience and conflict it can avoid and so asymmetric states allow themselves to be subordinated by hydro-hegemons. Yet, cooperation does not always fall disproportionately on asymmetric states, hydro-hegemons also want to prevent the establishment of other coalitions with outside states, subsequently compromise and cooperation may occur which is more advantageous to asymmetric states (LeMarquand, 1977). 

The extent to where the hydro political pendulum falls between conflict and cooperation is also dependent on the scalar nature of the situation. Funder et al's 2010 work suggests that large scale hydro politics is often cooperative, whereas small scale hydro politics is more likely to be conflictual (Funder et al, 2010). Their research is based upon the Namwala District in Zambia, a case study which I covered in my fourth blog, where the conflict was highly localised and revolved around everyday life (Magombeyi et al, 2008). Many large scale water conflicts are purposefully avoided, due to the large scale, detrimental effects that a country could incur, due to the widespread violence that would ensue regardless of loss or victory. However, on a small scale local areas are not as diplomatic due to the fact they are making a decision that will most likely only affect themselves, and not an entire country, with the detrimental effects not being so severe (Lankford et al, 2009). Smaller scale hydro political conflict can also sometimes be conflict for the sake of publicity, to draw the attention of the government to prevalent issues with the water system in that local area, therefore conflict can often lead to cooperation by the government and a resolution.

'Water is an irritant and a unifier' and in this blog I have outlined the multifaceted nature of hydro political conflict and cooperation; reasons why the pendulum is bound to swing one way or the other, the winners and losers of cooperation and importance of diplomatic and pragmatic decision making in the governance of water.