Blog 2: Hydropolitical conflict over the Lesotho Highlands Water Project

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LWHP) is a binational proposal with the aim of supplying South Africa with water from the Lesotho highlands, which would be mutually beneficial to both parties. Lesotho wanted to harness its copious 'white gold' water supply into financial gain, by supplying the water-scarce South Africa with a valuable commodity (Maro, 2011). This project, however was greatly overshadowed by hydro political conflict, whereby cooperation between the two riparian states was centred principally on the mutual gain of each's political elite (Mwangi, 2007).

Figure 1 - Map showing the LWHP and its context in South Africa 

At the crux of this hydro political conflict, is the concept of water scarcity, where insufficient supply meets copious demand, which perpetually results in conflict among and within nations (Gleick, 1993). The project was first suggested by the British High Commissioner of Lesotho, when the country was still under British rule, after Economists had perceived the rainfall quantities in Basotholand to be a potential source of exchangeable currency. Negotiations fell through in the 1960s when Lesotho was independent, initially due to disagreement over the purchasing price of water and Lesotho wanting to distance itself politically from the South African apartheid regime, which resulted in tenacious and volatile relations between the two countries (Shand, 1997). Relations were increasingly heightened when South Africa considered developing instead, the cheaper Tugala Transfer scheme, located inside the country. But by the late 1970s, after suffering from a prolific amount of droughts which led to the Vaal basin becoming increasingly depleted and with South African demand for water increasing 10 to 15% per year, South Africa became desperate (Mwangi, 2007). Lesotho were still wanting to distance themselves politically from the apartheid regime, and were unsure about the benefits outweighing the costs environmentally.

The stage became set for a potential conflict, with South Africa becoming increasingly irritated and desperate for a stable and copious water supply, but Lesotho was being unwavering in its standpoint (Roney, 1997). In December 1985, cross-border physical conflict occurred when 13 white South Africans were killed by landmines and bombs supposedly planted there by Lesotho-based African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas. This display of physical violence allegedly by Lesotho was used to the advantage of South Africa who subsequently had the upper hand in negotiations, imposing a new military government led by General Justin Lekhanya. This government was often seen as a 'puppet government' in succumbing to most of the requests of the South African government, including those to do with the LWHP. So much so that some authors have suggested that this was  a South African water coup, in order to advance political gain (Baillat, 1994). Lesotho agreed that South Africa be entitled to a large quantity of Lesotho's water resources. In return, Lesotho was to receive modest annual payments and assistance in constructing the colossal project as well as hydroelectric stations (Mwangi, 2007). Negotiations came to a head in 1986 under the LWHP treaty with South Africa. 

Previous conflict discussed in this blog has been to do with hydropolitical conflict at the international, transnational, national and governmental levels and has been both violent and latent conflict. Relations politically between the two riparian states after the 1986 treaty apart from the conflict in 1998, were mostly positive and fruitful and so the conflict hereafter is generally consequential of the building and construction of the LWHP itself, demonstrating the multifaceted nature of hydropolitical conflict. 

in 1998, a political crisis in Lesotho, mostly a consequence of its electoral system, resulted in the first 'water war' in the region. Conflict arose between the government and the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF), the latter demanding that the King dismantle government due to alleged fraudulent elections in their opinion (Likoti, 2007). The Lesotho police were unable to contain the violence and amid fears of a military coup the South African Development Community (SADC) decided to intervene under Operation Boleas. The SADC'S motives behind this intervention have been extremely controversial, as it is suggested that this was in fact an attempt to safeguard the LWHP and not to resolve the violence within Lesotho. 31 SANDF soldiers attacked LDF soldiers guarding the Katse Dam, the largest dam and main reservoir of the Project, even though this dam was far from the turbulent areas. Several LDF soldiers were killed in the attack and the dam was 'secured', symbolising the violent and conflictual relations that can arise due to the presence and ownership of water (Odendaal, 2000). 

Figure 2 - Photo of the LWHP

Conflictual and sometimes violent relations also arose between local parties as a direct effect of the construction and building of the LWHP. Lesothians suffered from ecocide and displacements which compromised their quality of life and created tensions between said new communities that often resulted in bloodshed (Bildhaeuser, 2010). The displacement of communities often led to conflict in their new homes, due to increasing competition for resources and land and the clashing of cultural and moral values (Ryan, 2015). 

Therefore, the multifarious nature of hydropolitical conflicts in this case between Lesotho and South Africa are vast. A large amount of hydropolitical water conflicts are most often transnational, due to the complications of integrating and compromising the individual requirements and desires of a whole other nation state. On top of this, the political discrepancies in ideology at the time between independent Lesotho and apartheid South Africa exacerbated these already intense and strained relations over the LWHP. Water scarcity creates an uneven playing field, favouring one area over another, in this case the water rich Lesotho over the drought-ridden South Africa. The ability to navigate and resolve such inequalities takes a lot of pragmatism, diplomacy and above all compromise, concepts which countries (all of whom who are somewhat self- interested) can be reluctant to recognise.